In my previous entry I pointed out that Nussbaum´s
capabilities approach seems to depend entirely on the intuitive idea of human
dignity, and argued that this leaves her theory in a vulnerable position. Nussbaum argues for her theory from the
assumption that all human beings (and other animals) have an inherent worth
which entitles them to the development and exercise of certain capabilities
essential to living a life worthy of their dignity. At the same time, she
criticizes Rawls and various other social contract theorists for assuming too
much, or for simply assuming the wrong things. Thus, it seems to me, that if we
are to grant Nussbaum the assumption of human dignity, we would somehow have to
establish that it is (a) a valid assumption to make and (b) a better assumption
to make than the ones made by Rawls and the social contract theorists who are the
object of her criticism. This can be done in various ways, two of which I will
explore in this brief essay.
The
most obvious, and I think strongest, case for granting Nussbaum the assumption
of human dignity can be made by evaluating the capabilities approach in light
of the results it yields. The very reason Nussbaum constructs her theory is to
address various shortcomings of other theories of justice, shortcomings which she
holds are all solved by the capabilities approach. Arguing that all humans are
entitled to the development and exercise of certain fundamentally human
capabilities allows her to conceive of transnational relations of justice and,
perhaps more importantly, to address the problem of how to extend theories of
justice to cover the just treatment of physically or mentally impaired individuals,
something most other theories of justice are unable to do. Arguing that all
other life-forms are similarly entitled to treatment worthy of their dignity
allows her to extend these theories to cover the just treatment of animals. Judging
by results, then, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is, in various ways, an
improvement of these other theories of justice (such as Rawls’s). Her theory
covers a wider area of justice than the social contract theories do, and thus seems
to be fairer or more just, a good reason to grant her the assumption of human
dignity.
According
to Nussbaum, however, there are better reasons to believe in human dignity than
mere pragmatic ones. “The idea of what human beings need for a fully human
living,” she writes, “is among the most vivid intuitive ideas we share” (p.
279). The assumption of human dignity, she argues, is a fair one because intuitively, everyone feels it is right;
it is an intuition shared by many. There is something inviolable, inherently
worthy, about human beings, something that entitles them to flourish, to live
up fully to their human potential. “The intuitive idea of a life with human
dignity,” she writes, “suggests this: people are entitled not only to mere
life, but to a life compatible with human dignity” (292). This is why we often
think it is a travesty when we witness injustices; we are ethical beings who
intuitively feel that all human beings have equal dignity and are thus equally
entitled to a life worthy of that dignity. Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is
an attempt to render explicit what human beings already know implicitly: the
basic requirements of a fully human life. Thus, Nussbaum makes the argument
that the assumption of human dignity is a valid assumption to make because it
is grounded in widely shared intuitions.
This
argument is slightly more problematic. Although I agree with Nussbaum that
there is such a thing as the intuitive idea of human dignity, that it is an
idea which every human being will relate to in one way or another, it is not
altogether clear that “the idea of what human beings need for a fully human
living” is the same for everyone who feels that all human beings have equal
dignity. The concept of human dignity may entail different things for different
individuals, even for those who have grown up in similar cultures. Thus, although
the intuition of human dignity may be shared by many individuals, this does not
necessarily mean the same thing for all of these individuals. Laura Brouwer
explores this problem in more depth in her entry “Nussbaum on
Thin Ice.” Another objection that may be raised against the
assumption of human dignity is that there appear to be so many injustices in
the world, and so many of them caused by human beings, that we may doubt
whether the intuition of human dignity really is one that is shared by many. Of
course, this objection may be brushed off by pointing out that all theories are
slightly idealized and generalized (slightly different from reality), or by arguing that human beings really do
share this intuitive idea but that the social arrangements of reality render it impossible for everyone to live up to
it.
In my
first blog entry I asked whether or not intuitions, even intuitions that are
shared by many, are really a strong enough foundation upon which to base a
theory as ambitious as the one Nussbaum is developing—and I am still not sure.
The idea of human dignity is a beautiful idea, and it enables Nussbaum to
construct a theory of justice that covers a wider area than many other ones.
The three unsolved problems of justice around which she bases her book, Frontiers of Justice, all seem to be
solved by the capabilities approach. This is a strong reason for granting her
the assumption of human dignity and seems to indicate that the assumption is
better than the assumptions on which the social contract theorists base their
theories, assumptions criticized by Nussbaum. Still, the concept of human
dignity is conspicuously empty; it may mean different things to different
individuals—and where does it come from? Intuition alone? If so, is it a strong
enough intuition to support the capabilities approach? The jury is (still) out.
Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers
of Justice (Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 273-324.
Barend de Rooij, (3rd year student, LUC)
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