Wednesday, 3 April 2013

Beyond Compassion and Humanity


We, humans, do not live alone in this world. We are surrounded by other creatures, creatures that play a functional role in our survival. Thus we have a duty to take care of the animals (especially from a utilitarian point of view): our productivity largely depends on their perpetuation. However we also share resources with them; plants, flowers, water etc. are a basic need for all animals, human and nonhuman, and they are fundamental in the maintenance of the world, of the circle of life.

Martha Nussbaum in her chapter believes in extending the “mechanism of basic justice, entitlement and law across the species barrier” (326). She criticizes Kantian social contract theories because of their commitment to rationality and of their conception of political principles derived from a contract among rough equals (327). Thus they deny obligations of justice towards nonhuman animals; the capabilities approach instead provides better theoretical guidance to the issue of animal entitlements. It recognizes a wide range of types of animal dignity and corresponding needs for flourishing since it takes into consideration the variety of activities and goals that different creatures pursue (327).

Despite the author’s virtuous will, her view is highly problematic because of its impracticality and lack of necessity. The social theory contract arises from a reality in which individuals by interacting among each other organize themselves into political societies. Individuals became citizens tied through a legal system of rights and duties. Hence when we discuss justice and law not only entitlements are involved but also obligations; how can this relationship, between the two forces, be balanced when extended to the other species? How can you decide nonhuman’s responsibilities?

Nussbaum thinks of animals in terms of agents and subjects that seek a flourishing existence (337); however she seems to forget one of her most crucial points in her entire discourse: the subjects in this case would not be represented during the decision making process. She justifies this point by arguing that the two questions, “who makes the laws and principles” and “for whom are the laws and principles made”, can be treated separately (349). Precisely from this position the problem of Nussbaum’s theory, and ultimately of democracy, arises: the total of subjective opinions becomes the objective one and because it is treated so, it is applied all over. If we were to take into consideration the different opinions people, cultures and religions have on animals and on their function, we would find divergences that are irresolvable. National rules can be implemented, but a general consensus stands far away from the reality in which we live.

Furthermore the nonhuman animal community is already shaped by laws; these laws follow the survival of the fittest. Although they are not necessarily ‘just’ (since they do not provide equal opportunity), we nevertheless find an order inherent in its perpetuation. This is not to say that Nussbaum is not correct in the provision of regulations regarding the treatment of animals; however the process of extending the mechanism of basic justice, entitlement and law should end at the point where the animal’s well being is met. Jewish law presents an example on the practicality of such notion. In the discussion of whether animal experimentation is biblically or rabbinically legal, Rabbi Caro declares that there must be a real objective. If the benefit to scientific knowledge is negligible, trivial or minor and other means can be approached to have the same final conclusion, animal experimentation is not allowed.[i] This argument demonstrates how the nonhuman species can be utilized as tools, but their essence and goodness must be kept into consideration.

Martha Nussbaum’s chapter “Beyond Compassion and Humanity”, although it provides an interesting reading, does not strengthen her capabilities approach theory. Her argument seems rather exaggerated and not fully feasible when put into practice.

Source: Nussbaum, chapter 6 “Beyond Compassion and Humanity”

By Georgia Rae Lasio (Third year student, LUC)


[i] Rabbi Alfred S. Cohen, “Animal Experimentation”, in The Journal of Halacha, 19-32. 

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